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[Vol. 98:1797 women's life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge and women are overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii). The authors argue that by applying the standard of a reasonable woman in each of these areas -that is by making woman the measure of man -the le gal system will be forced to recognize women's perspectives. They de fine the reasonable woman as one who wants and demands "respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix), and they elaborate that "behavior violating these aspects of woman's humanity is legally unacceptable" (p. xix).
The idea of recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting re gard, respect, and empathy for women in these situations is an impor tant and appealing goal.5 The use of a reasonable woman standard will not be as effective a means of achieving this goal as actually nam ing the harms that women suffer and revealing the patriarchal system that maintains the invisibility of those harms. Furthermore, Forell and Matthews' proposal to use a reasonable woman standard implicates two fundamental problems that have plagued feminist thinkers: the "sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem. Although Forell and Matthews acknowledge these issues,6 their solu tion -looking to a reasonable woman standard -does not ade quately address them because it fails to name the power dynamic that initially creates the problems. Using a reasonable woman standard implicitly accepts the fundamental notion of legal liberalism that all members of society are equally-situated, autonomous actors, albeit with different perspectives. By failing to address the systems of privi lege that maintain the sex-based, gendered status quo, the reasonable woman standard cannot go far enough to ensure that the legal system will recognize women's harms.7
5. The idea of the reasonable woman having a different view of facts and culpability, particularly in the criminal context, received popular attention in Susan Glaspell's short story, A Jury of her Peers. The story describes a woman arrested following the death of her husband. The male law enforcement officers see a clear-cut case of homicide. The women who accompany the officers to the crime scene see a darker tale of domestic hardship and abuse. Their identification with the perspective of the arrested woman defendant underlines the critical importance of perspective in evaluating human actions -the need for a jury of her peers. See Marina Angel, Criminal Law and Women: Giving the Abused Wo man Who Kills A Jury of Her Peers Who Appreciate Trifles, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 229 (1996) (dis cussing Glaspell's story as a vehicle for teaching and the idea of diverse perspectives it raises); Patricia L. Bryan, Stories in Fiction and in Fa ct: Susan Glaspell's a Jury of Her Peers and the 1901 Murder Trial of Margaret Hossack, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1293 REV. (1997 {addressing the biases and assumptions that shape the narratives told in the courtroom).
6. Chapter 2, "The Meaning of Equality," discusses these subjects. Pp. 8-19.
7. Another debate in feminist theory concerns the use of the term "gender" or the term "sex" to describe disadvantaging treatment of women. "Gender" advocates emphasize the cultural conditioning surrounding women's oppression. Those who urge the use of "sex" often highlight the role of biological difference. This essay uses "sex" and "gender" inter changeably because both biology and culture contribute to the system of power that privi leges maleness. For a more complete discussion of the "sex" and "gender" debate, see I.
THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF A REASONABLE WOMAN STANDARD
Forell and Matthews correctly identify the areas of sexual harass ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape as spheres in which harms against women have long been ignored and are often still misunder stood by the legal system. One of the strengths of this book is the authors' ability to powerfully explain and provide examples of the problems women face. The legal system is not responsive to women's life experience in these four highlighted areas. Forell and Matthews believe that the use of a reasonable woman standard will serve to cor rect that systemic nonresponsiveness. 8 The authors begin in the area of sexual harassment, by reviewing the evolution of legal doctrine and relating the important educational function of the Clarence Thomas Senate confirmation hearings, in which Anita Hill described the work environment created by the Supreme Court nominee (p. 24). The authors next report a series of cases and urge that the application of the reasonable woman standard would result in the correct decision. According to the authors, the proper result could be achieved by ensuring that a court would look at the workplace conduct through the eyes of the woman employee com plaining of the harassment.9 The many cases in which courts and the public do not recognize the sexual harassment that women experience at work as a harm show that the authors are correct in identifying this area as one in which experiences differ and a woman's perspective is often not regarded as legitimate.
Stalking is another area in which the legal system has only rela tively recently recognized a specific legal harm.10 As the authors ex plain: "The law's inaction on stalking exemplifies how the male biased legal system values the male stalkers' freedom of action and speech over the female targets' security and emotional well-being" (p. 126). Deploring the use of stalking as a scenario for humor in recent films like Th ere's Something About Mary, Porell and Matthews em phasize that stalking is far from flattering or fun (p. 128). The authors perceptively explain that stalking is part of a pattern of gendered vio lence against women.11 Here again, the authors urge that use of the standard of a reasonable woman will ensure that stalkers will be prosecuted.12 a reasonable woman standard in order to combat sexual harassment, particularly as of means of promoting "greater employer consciousness in discovering and rectifying sexual harass ment problems"); David I. authors' discussion here illustrates one difficulty in using this book. This writer would be the first to object to the culture of legal writing that relegates its most salient points to footnotes, such as the infamous note 20 in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) , which says treating individuals differently on account of pregnancy is not sex discrimination, or the well known Carotene Products footnote, emphasizing the protection of "discrete and insular mi norities," 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). Nonetheless, the lack of footnotes in this book is dis tracting for the legal researcher, who would benefit from having a citation to the stalking statute. The lay reader, however, is unlikely to seek the statute and may well appreciate the flow of the text without footnotes.
11. As for its potential application to legal studies, this stalking chapter could provide a useful primer on the underlying gender issues for a torts or criminal law course. To reduce an intentional felonious homicide from the offense of murder to manslaughter upon the ground of sudden quarrel or heat of passion, the provocation must be of the char acter and degree as naturally would excite and arouse the passion, and the assailant must act under the infl uence of that sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
The heat of passion which will reduce a homicide to manslaughter must be such a passion as naturally would be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person in the same circumstances. A defendant is not permitted to set up [ The question to be answered is whether or not, at the time of the killing, the reason of the accused was obscured or disturbed by passion to such an extent as would cause the ordi narily reasonable person of average disposition to act rashly and without deliberation and refl ection, and from passion rather than from judgment.
If there was provocation, [whether of short or long duration,] but of a nature not nor mally sufficient to arouse passion, or if sufficient time elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, and if an unlawful killin g of a hu man being followed the provocation and had all the elements of murder, as I have defined it, the mere fact of slight or remote provocation will not reduce the offense to manslaughter. [Vol. 98:1797 homicide" (p. 172). The authors also outline the problems with the traditional law of self-def ense faced by battered women who kill. Here, however, improvement is slowly showing, and the authors ac knowledge that in some jurisdictions "the legal system is starting to get it right" by accepting the serious implications of domestic violence.15
In the area of rape, Farell and Matthews review the long-standing stereotypes that female rape victims must combat: "women want to be seduced and to have their verl;Jal and physical resistance overcome; women's behavior and clothing indicate willingness to engage in sex ual intercourse; and women don't tell the truth about sex" (pp. 222-23). In this male-defined world in which "no" does not mean "no,'' a woman's consent to sexual intercourse serves as a defense to a charge of rape. The authors acknowledge a debt to Susan Estrich's landmark work on rape law's validation of the male perspective, particularly in the field of acquaintance rape.16 Catharine MacKinnon, discussing the prevalence of unprosecuted rapes and acquittals in cases in which rape is charged, has taken this criticism a step further, explaining that under this legal regime rape is effectively allowed.17 Farell and Matthews urge the reasonable woman standard as the remedy, holding men "to the standard of how women would like men to behave."18
Having explored the inadequacies of the legal system in these four areas that affect women's lives, Farell and Matthews offer a self M proclaimed "radical" solution (p. 241). In an effort to remedy these grave inadequacies and to compel the legal system to take seriously the harms that women suffer, they propose applying a "reasonable woman" standard to men's conduct in these situations. Where men's and women's life experiences and views are so different and it is women who are "overwhelmingly the inj ured parties" (p. xvii), the authors reason that this "deliberate use of the reasonable woman standard in areas involving sex, sexism, and aggression, with careful explanation of what the standard means, will elicit greater empathy for women's experiences from society in general and from legal decision makers in particular" (p. xix). Farell and Matthews define a reason able woman as someone requiring "respect, personal autonomy, agency, and bodily integrity" (p. xix). According to the authors: a reasonable woman would be more likely to experience pornography and degrading treatment in the workplace as sexual harassment and con sider no to mean no when sex is involved. She would also likely view killing a domestic partner who leaves or gets involved with someone else as murder and killin g one's batterer out of fear of severe injury or death as self-defense. [t]hese sexually explicit and degrading images included "a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it, observed on a wall next to the sheetmetal shop"; "a picture of a nude Black woman, pubic area exposed to reveal her labia, seen in a public locker room"; "draw ings and graffiti on the walls including a drawing depicting a frontal view of a nude female torso with the words 'USDA Choice' written on it ... in an area where Robinson was assigned to work"; and "a dart board with a drawing of a woman's breast with her nipple as the bull's eye." [p. 45] Surely this is conduct that a reasonable man or woman might find of fensive in a work environment. The employer conducted a defense suggesting that the female plaintiff was "extrasensitive about sexually offensive conduct" (p. 54). The employer further presented testimony from a female employee who said "pictorial displays of naked women did not offend her, and she suggested that Robinson 'was spending too much time attending to the pictures and not enough time attending to her job' " (p. 54). This testimony by a female co-employee demon strates the difficulty with using a reasonable woman standard; the em- [Vol. 98:1797 ployer urges that this woman who is not upset by her coworkers' be havior is the reasonable one. The authors explain that this woman undoubtedly wanted to keep her "high-paying job" (p. 54) and there fore denied the "negative effects of the hostile environment" (p. 54).
The authors correctly explain that Robinson highlights how differ ently men and women may view their work environments, but here even women perceived the environment differently from each other. Porell and Matthews assert that the use of the reasonable woman standard in this case led to the correct result -the plaintiff prevailed on her hostile work environment claim. But it is unclear, where women themselves disagree, why the reasonable woman standard would always (or even often) lead to the vindication of women who complain about sexual harassment. Even the successful Robinson plaintiff was denied monetary damages by the court, which did afford her injunctive relief.
In the area of stalking, Porell and Matthews urge that a reasonable woman standard should be applied to the stalker's conduct to ensure that the legal determination as to whether the stalker's behavior mer its legal intervention will reflect women's notions of fear, not men's. The authors explain that attitudes toward stalking are gendered, that "this kind of conduct rarely happens to men, and [that] when it does, it's usually annoying, not terrifying" (p. 126). Most state statutes re quire as a threshold for legal intervention that the stalker's behavior pose a "credible threat" of harm.23 Porell and Matthews believe that, by applying the reasonable woman standard and asking whether the conduct would make a reasonable woman fearful, the legal system will ensure that the stalker's behavior is evaluated from the perspective of those individuals the law seeks to protect. "[R]easonable women are likely to experience fear in situations where reasonable men would not" (p. 133). The authors elaborate: "It is reasonable for a woman to be frightened when she experiences repeated and unwelcome visual, verbal, or written contact that indicates sexual interest or anger at re jection. Because, in the context of stalking, fear is gendered, stalking statutes need to explicitly take this into account" (p. 135). Ironically, the author's critique of stalking statutes' failure to value expressly a female perspective demonstrates why a reasonable woman standard is not the best method for achieving the goal of recognizing the harm women suffer. Instead of drafting statutes using vague language of reasonableness, legislatures should name the conduct that is objec tionable.24 Conduct that induces fear in a reasonable woman, "re- 24. See id. at 52 (proposing model anti-stalking legislation). While this proposed legisla tion uses "reasonableness" language, it also details objectionable conduct. See id.
peated and unwelcome visual, verbal, or written contact that indicates sexual interest or anger at rejection" (p. 135), could be targeted di rectly by lawmakers without a need to resort to the vagaries of rea sonableness, gendered or otherwise.
III. THE SYSTEM OF MALE PRMLEGE
The conduct described as stalking and the notion that women in the workplace are sexual objects both result directly from a system of male privilege. Systems of privilege are "elusive and fugitive,"25 de riving their power from their very invisibility. Privilege defines the so cietal norm and measure for us all,26 yet, because each system is hard to see, and because systems of privilege interact to reinforce them selves, the power of privilege remains difficult to erode. MacKinnon offers perhaps the most complete description of the system of male privilege that defines vital aspects of American life from a male point of view:
Men's physiology defines most sports, their health needs largely define insurance coverage, their socially designed biographies define workplace expectations and successful career patterns, their perspectives and con cerns define quality in scholarship, their experiences and obsessions de fine merit, their military service defines citizenship, their presence de fines family, their inability to get along with each other -their wars and rulerships -define history, their image defines god, and their genitals define sex.27
MacKinnon's examples articulate the male tilt that is present in seemingly neutral ideas and words that define society as we know it.28 Rarely do we question "the way things are."29 Male privilege and entitlement, which derive from early notions of women as the property of their fathers and husbands, remain as a ves tige of that history in stalking behavior by men. The authors recognize that a connection exists between stalking, sexual harassment, and do mestic homicide. They examine two sexual harassment cases that in- 29. Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 17 ("Privilege is not visible to its holder; it is merely there, a part of the world, a way of life, simply the way things are.").
[Vol. 98:1797 volved stalking (pp. 138-48) and cases where the stalking of former in timates resulted in homicide (pp. 149-54). Rather than relying on use of a reasonable woman standard, a privilege analysis names and rec ognizes that continuum of gendered violence. Advocates of the rea sonable woman standard may reject a privilege analysis. Indeed, the authors might answer that because the legal system, and indeed soci ety, is imbued in that system of male privilege, the male behaviors are not named or recognized as terrifying. The authors might urge that a reasonable woman standard is required to highlight a different view of these behaviors, which are ordinarily seen as the "way things are." While it is true that those with privilege rarely recognize it as such,30 the failure to identify and name privilege as systemic merely perpetu ates its existence. Focusing on reasonable women and engaging in the debate over whether to use an ungendered or gendered "objective" standard to measure behavior steers the discussion away from the heart of the matter. Using a gendered standard may achieve some vic tories that combat systems of privilege, but it can only do so by indi rection, leaving the system of male privilege intact.
IV. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND RAPE: OF REASONABLE WOMEN
AND MALE PRIVILEGE Domestic violence is another site at which law has permitted male privilege to be maintained through nonintervention in the domestic sphere -a sphere labeled as "private." Leading feminist scholars31 have documented the poverty of this public/private distinction, which leaves women unprotected in the so-called private realm. Forell and Matthews recognize that the interaction of the criminal law doctrines of self-defense32 and heat of passion/provocation in the area of domes- tic homicide result in blaming female victims for causing their own death or holding them criminally responsible for the death of their at tackers. They use examples from cases such as United States v. Paul,33 which described the female victim as dying "during a fight with her husband."34 The authors correctly point out that this language, "died during a fight," implies a fair fight that "unfortunately ended in acci dental death" (p. 165). The authors claim that "[l]ack of respect for women's well-being and autonomy underlies what is wrong with the current law of domestic homicide" (p. 168).
It is true that women's well-being and autonomy are not respected by the legal system. And as the authors assert, "cultural norms and expectations"(p. 168) play a role in how legal doctrines are inter preted. But the authors' phrasing the goal of their reasonable woman reform in terms of women's autonomy belies their assertion that their proposal is a radical one. Liberal legalism posits that all members of the nation state are autonomous, equal, and independent actors. This reasonable woman language veils the systems of privilege preventing the realization of a legal system of equally situated members.35 By fo cusing the discussion on reasonable behavior, the reasonable woman standard preserves the underlying hierarchical power dynamic and fails to name and unmask male privilege, while appearing to be a pro gressive reform.36
Applying the reasonable woman standard to rape law, Forell and Matthews urge "if a woman believes she was raped and a reasonable woman would have believed the intercourse was without consent, it was rape."37 They advocate: 37. P. 239. In this passage Forell and Matthews seem to concede that sexual conduct must involve heterosexual intercourse to be considered rape. Many state statutes have rede fined the crime to include "penetration by objects," so that rape may include other sexual behaviors beyond heterosexual intercourse. See, e.g., Cassia C. Spohn, Th e Rape Reform Movement: Th e Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119 (1999) (describing changes in rape law during the last thirty years). Spohn explains:
[T]he Michigan statute, considered to be a model rape reform law, defines sexual pene tration as "sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal open ing of another person's body, but emission of semen not required."
Id. at 122-23 (quoting MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN . § 750.520a (1991)).
[ The authors argue that asking these questions ensures a standard that "embodies respect for women's autonomy, physical integrity and right to control their sexuality" (p. 240). But, here again, the authors have specified behaviors that exemplify criminal conduct, making the no tion of reasonableness unnecessary. Only by making the implicit ex plicit and by naming the system of male privilege that governs rape law can the legal system begin not to privilege that male point of view. Challenging action committed with the presence of "force, intimida tion, or threats of force" (p. 239) and questioning the anti-woman use of the consent defense in rape law will dismantle the system of male privilege that presumes women's availability for sexual activity.
Recognizing the harms women suffer and eliciting empathy for women in these situations remain vital objectives. But a truly radical change would result from challenging cultural norms and expectations by changing the dominant idea of what conduct is acceptable and what behaviors are harmful to women. Martha Mahoney demonstrated this power of naming by identifying separation assault as "an assault that by its nature takes place over time,"38 every time a woman tries to separate from her violent partner "before she finally kills her abuser."39 Finding the words to describe women's experience, as Mahoney did, changed the face of the battered woman's self-defense claim, clarifying the reality of the existence of imminent danger of death or great bodily harm. In bringing "the ghosts of dead womenwomen slain by their abusers -into court to stand beside the woman accused of killin g an abusive spouse,"40 Mahoney did not seek a rea sonable woman standard (though arguably the battered woman's be havior is also reasonable). Rather by naming the harm women faced -the separation assault -Mahoney addressed the power in the rela tionship and exposed the privilege given to men to perpetrate their abuse. 
V. THE SAMENESS/DIFF ERENCE EQUALITY PROBLEM AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN
Porell and Matthews' proposal to use the reasonable woman as the measure of man is also problematic because it implicates two funda mental problems that have continued to plague feminist thinkers: the "sameness/difference" equality problem and the essentialism problem. The paradigm language that constitutionally protects the notion of equality appears in the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides in relevant part: "No State shall ... deny to any person within its juris diction the equal protection of the laws. "41 This language does not re quire a comparison mode. Yet equal protection jurisprudence has re lied upon this comparison mode, comparing the treatment of women to men and maintaining the status quo that privileges men.42 Early feminist litigation in the Supreme Court urged equal access to jobs and education by comparing women to men and asking the Court to treat both sexes in the same manner.43 Thus the Court held that women could be estate administrators,44 receive military benefits for their spouses under federal law,45 and purchase 3.2% beer. 46 Soon, however, the "sameness/difference" equality problem sur faced in the debate within the feminist legal community surrounding the treatment of pregnancy.47 In the 1980s feminist litigators sought "to articulate a feminist vision that went beyond identical treatment to men."48 But the theorizing of difference or accommodation or special treatment, as this feminist vision was alternately characterized,49 pro duced a serious schism in the feminist legal community. Opponents of accommodation for women's workplace needs feared creating stereo- types of women workers that would be used to keep women from the access only so recently won.so MacKinnon elaborates upon the critique of the comparison mode prevalent in equality theory, explaining that two paths to equality are allowed to women.st Women must either "be the same as men" or "be different from men."52 MacK.innon continues:
Under the sameness standard, women are measured according to our correspondence with man, our equality judged by our proximity to his measure. Under the difference standard, we are measured according to our lack of correspondence with him, our womanhood judged by our dis tance from his measure. Gender neutrality is thus simply the male stan dard, and the special protection rule is simply the female standard, but do not be deceived: masculinity, or maleness, is the referent for both.53
Porell and Matthews acknowledge that a "reasonable woman stan dard intentionally highlights difference" (p. 9). Clearly conscious of this sameness/difference equality problem, Porell and Matthews seek by their subtitle, "The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man," to remedy the problem of male normativity by making the reasonable woman the measure. But this linguistic exchange fails meaningfully to address systemic male privilege and, in fact, contributes to the liberal, legal notion that all citizens are full and equal participants in society. The Porell and Matthews solution to the sameness/difference debate -making woman the measure of man -contributes to the veiling of the system of male privilege. Women and men are not fungible halves of a gender category whose places can be simply exchanged. Even when their places are switched, so that women are the measure of men, femaleness still occupies a subordinate position in the prevalent gender hierarchy that privileges maleness. Dismantling that system involves more than flipping positions; this false notion of fungibility simply encourages the kind of liberal legalist thinking that veils the system of privilege.
VI. THE ESSENTIALISM PROBLEM AND THE REASONABLE WOMAN
Porell and Matthews' proposal also cannot resolve the "essential ism problem." The essentialism problem in feminist theory refers to the difficulty in speaking accurately about "women" as if women fit some universal definition. While essentialism is a term with a number of meanings within feminist theory,54 the term is often understood to mean that "overgeneralizations or unstated reference points implicitly attribute to all members of a group the characteristics of a dominant subset of that group."55 As Katharine Bartlett and Angela Harris ex plain: "A common subj ect for critique is the unstated, sometimes un conscious assumption that for purposes of feminism, 'women' are white, middle class, heterosexual, able-bodied, and otherwise privi leged."56 They ask whether it is possible to theorize ab out "women" without "indulging" this essentialist assumption. No discussion of gendered assumptions, whether using language of the reasonable woman or relying on an articulation of a system of male privilege, can escape the essentialism trap. Using essentialism strategically -trying to avoid its pitfalls while trying to dismantle systemic privilege -and remembering the connections between systems of privilege seem the best available approach offered by feminist theory.57 As Harris ex plains elsewhere:
[F] eminist theorizing about "women" must ... be strategic and contingent, focusing on relationships, not essences .... [W]omen will be able to acknowledge their differences without threatening feminism itself. In the process, as feminists begin to attack racism and classism and homo phobia, feminism will change from being only about "women as women" (modified women need not apply), to being about all kinds of oppression based on seemingly inherent and unalterable characteristics. We need not wait for a unified theory of oppression; that theory can be femi nism.58
The reasonable woman standard and a privilege analysis both require recognition of context, the best method for avoiding the essentialism trap.
54. Katharine Bartlett and Angela Harris summ arize seven meanings for the term "es sentialism," including the asswnption mentioned here, as well as "the applicability of West ern feminism to other cultures," the view that gender oppression is "the most 'fundamental' or 'primary' oppression," "selecting out only one possible source of a woman's identitysuch as her gender, race, class, or sexual preference -and treating it as severable from the rest of her being," treating women "as a self-explanatory category, often defined by biol ogy." Bartlett and Harris also note that the term "essentialism" implicates the problems of categorization and perspective. See 612 (1990) (describing the need to be strategic in discussing the category "woman"); see also Wildman with Davis, supra note 25, at 23 (discussing the koosh ball metaphor for multiple identity strands).
58. Harris, supra note 57, at 612 (footnotes omitted).
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As jurisprudential critiques, both the comparison mode, implicit in the sameness/difference debate about equality, and the essentialism problem ignore the systems of privilege that underlie the constructed identity categories. Whether one focuses on sex/gender and runs the risk of essentializing by omitting discussions of race, class, sexual ori entation, and other identity categories or whether one focuses on equality by talking about woman as the measure of man or the meas ure of reasonableness, these conversations mask the systems of privi lege. The categories embodied in each identity group do not exist on an equal plane in the social structure. Maleness is privileged over fe maleness, heterosexuality over queerness, economic advantage over poverty, whiteness over nonwhiteness. The path out of the same ness/difference equality trap and the essentialism problem necessarily travels through a discussion of systems of privilege.
MacKinnon has said she has not seen any reasonable people, only reasonable men and reasonable women, reflecting the idea that our lived reality is gendered.59 It is precisely this description of the differ ent norms of reasonableness as having sexually divergent meanings that makes the reasonable woman standard problematic and unhelpful in achieving a vision of equality in which women are not subjugated actors. Porell and Matthews' text is full of examples of male judges understanding a female plaintiff's or defendant's viewpoint and female judges who rule from a "male" perspective. Reifying a reasonable woman standard does not get us away from the problem of who is in terpreting that standard. Rather than leave to chance the vagaries of such interpretation, a helpful legal standard would make explicit the context of systemic privilege in which the decision is being made. Such a standard might ask whether the decision fosters notions of women as full and equal participants in society, recognizing the sys tems of privilege that prevent the promise of equal protection of the laws from being kept?60 59. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Sex and Violence, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 51, at 85, flJI ("I don't use the term persons, I guess, because I haven't seen many lately."). Women experience the world differently than men. This statement could be viewed as siding in the sameness/difference equality debate on the difference side. But en tering that debate assumes a fundamental premise of legal liberalism, that everyone is an equal actor in the nation state. MacKinnon rej ects this liberal legal view. Her description of gendered relations has been labeled "dominance theory" by several commentators. See, e.g. , BARTLETI & HARRIS, supra note 54, at 487; MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS IN FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 68-81 (1994); CHAMALLAS, supra note 43, at 53-62. The essentialism problem shows women also experi ence the world differently from each other. 60. Cf. Wildman, supra note 42, at 304-07 (articulating a participatory perspective for equal protection jurisprudence, a precursor to a recognition of systems of privilege).
VII. THE DIFF ICULTY IN NAMING SYSTEMIC MALE PRIVILEGE
Two cases, Soto v. Flores61 and Taylor v. State,62 demonstrate the need to identify systemic male privilege and the difficulties women face in achieving full, equal societal participation. These cases, with their compelling facts, illustrate a particularly egregious form of male privilege, in which the mechanism of the state functions to reinforce women's subjugation.
A. Soto v. Flores
In 1981 Flor Maria Soto married Angel Rodriguez ("Rafi"). 63 Their daughter, Sally, was born in 1983, and their son, Chayanne, was born in 1988.64 Rodriguez began abusing Soto emotionally and physi cally about one year into the marriage in incidents frequently con nected to drinking.65
Rodriguez performed gardening and vehicle repair work for police officers at the local Palmer Police Station, where he was friendly with several officers.66 The court explained that According to the court, during nine years of domestic violence "Soto had never sought help because she believed that the police would do nothing, because she had nowhere to go, and because she was afraid of Rodriguez."68 During this time, he had threatened her with a gun and threatened to kill members of her family if she went to the police to report his abuse.
In spite of these fears, on April 17, 1991, Soto went with her mother and children to the police station to report a beating.69 Officer Flores, who was on duty, summ oned help, referring to Ms. Soto as "Rafi's wife," told Soto that "he himself had domestic violence prob lems" for which his wife wanted him jailed, and "urged Soto to patch These events took place within a society seeking to address domes tic violence. In 1989 Puerto Rico had enacted a comprehensive anti domestic violence law, the Domestic Abuse Prevention and Interven tion Act, known popularly as "Law 54."72 Law 54 directs officers to arrest the abuser in any case in which an officer has grounds to believe the law has been violated.73 The law further requires officers to pro vide complainants with information about social services, offer trans portation to a safe place, transcribe a written report, ensure confiden tiality, and explicitly states that mediation or reconciliation efforts by police shall not substitute for arrest.74 The regulations further state: "Domestic violence ... frequently ends in intra-family homicide and it affects all the components of the family, including the children."75
As the court explained, even in the face of this comprehensive le gal framework, at the conclusion of his interview with Soto, the super vising officer "took no action.
[He] did not tell Soto about the avail ability of battered women's shelters or about procedures for obtaining an order of protection. Nor did he prepare a domestic violence re port."76 He did prepare an "Other Services Report," "falsely indi cat[ing] that Soto had visited the police solely for advice relating to child custody."77 Soto then returned to her mother's house.
The officer who had conducted the interview discussed the com plaint with his Sergeant. The Sergeant discussed it with Officer Flores, who stated that "Soto and her husband had marital problems because Rodriguez was an alcoholic. In a series of encounters over the next four days, Rodriguez went to Soto's mother's house to find her, argued with Soto in a local busi ness, took the children on a beach trip, and refused to return the chil dren twice.8 1 Finally on Sunday evening, because the children had school the next day, Soto went again to try to retrieve the children from her husband.82 As she stood on the lawn: proffer sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to infer that it is the policy or custom of the police to provide less protection to victims of domestic violence than to other victims. of violence, that dis crimination against women was a motivating factor, and that the plaintiff was injured by the policy or custom.88
The court conceded that Soto had introduced enough evidence to raise an issue as to whether the police had a custom or policy of pro viding less protection to domestic violence victims than to other crime victims. But the court concluded that Soto had failed to show dis criminatory purpose. did not derive from a sex-based motive, but instead from Flores' per sonal belief that "his friendship could provide a basis to resolve the matter."90 The court concluded by saying that even though it found against Ms. Soto, "we do not of course condone the actions and fail ures of duties we have described. The deaths of children, which may have followed from risks arguably created by the actions of public of ficials, are very serious matters."91
Soto provides another shocking illustration of gendered views of reality. This setting, in which the court dismisses a man's friendship network as personal, separate, and distinct from sex discrimination or discriminatory purpose, illustrates the kind of scenario that most con cerns Forell and Matthews. These "settings where men's and women's life experiences and views on sex and aggression diverge" (p. xvii) and where the children, Soto, and her relatives are "overwhelmingly the injured parties" (p. xvii) are sites where male privilege is contested. Forell and Matthews urge the reasonable woman standard as a solu tion to bring women's perspectives to the fore. Would a "reasonable jury" with a woman's perspective find the requisite intent to discrimi nate against women as a motivating factor?92 Would a judge with the perspective of a reasonable woman find that intent?
Reasonable men or women might well find discriminatory intent on these facts. The author of the Soto opinion, Judge Sandra Lynch,93 however, found no discriminatory intent as a matter of law. Asking her to examine the question of discriminatory intent from the perspec tive of a reasonable woman seeking autonomy seems redundant. As a judicial nominee of a Democratic president, she is a likely candidate for possessing views that coincide with a reasonable woman. In her own career she has sought to combat gender bias.94 Yet her life expe riences did not lead to a finding of sex discrimination in this case.
Could a privilege analysis help? If equal protection means not maintaining male privilege and ensuring women can be full societal 93. 103 F3d at 1058. Judge Lynch was appointed by President Clinton in 1994. See Judy Rakowsky, Lawyer Set fo r Breyer Va cancy; Lynch to Be First Woman on Circuit, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 1994, at 33 (detailing Lynch's legal career from activist law stu dent to her role tackling gender bias in the court system as president of the Boston Bar Association).
See id.
participants, then Soto's right to equal protection was violated. These male actors are not simply private men, buddies getting together to complain ab out women and the domestic violence act. They are also police officers, the representatives of the state, and they act in that ca pacity to undermine the law and maintain male privilege. Naming the harm Ms. Soto suffered by the police refusal to take her claim seri ously or to take Law 54 seriously, despite its language directed at such violent situations, confronts a system of state permission for domestic abuse. The gendered nature of the harm is apparent and systemic, not accidental.
B. Taylor [Vol. 98:1797
The judge instructed the jury as to both manslaughter and murder. The Mississippi Code96 defines manslaughter as "[t]he killing of a hu man being without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or un usual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense."97 Murder, however, must be committed with malice aforethought.98 Ms. Taylor appealed from the guilty verdict of murder alleging er ror in the exclusion of the testimony of psychologists as to her state of mind. The Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed her conviction, finding that the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony as to Ms. Taylor's state of mind was appropriate. The experts would have testified that "because of her state of mind, Mary Taylor's crime could not have been murder, but was manslaughter."99 The court rej ected the prof fered expert testimony as subj ective, stating that "the question of whether a defendant acted without malice and in the heat of passion is an obj ective one." 1 00 The court evaluated the elements that would re duce a killing to manslaughter in terms of a reasonable provocation and whether a "reasonable man [sic] so provoked would not have cooled off. " 1 0 1
Reasonable provocation is a term that is gender neutral on its face, presumably permitting women as well as men to be reasonably pro voked. Forell and Matthews maintain that it is a "bizarre kind of equality" (p. 177) that would allow women to claim the defense of pas sion/provocation for homicides. The authors believe that this solution is a "false and perverse equality" because "women almost never kill their intimates out of jealousy or anger about rejection" (p. 177).
Passion/provocation remains a troubling defense. Reasonable men and reasonable women arguably do not kill. But the defense exists as a safety valve within the criminal justice system to recognize human weakness and loss of control.1 0 2 The defense does not seek to condone homicidal behavior, but to acknowledge that different degrees of criminal conduct and culpability do exist. Women may rarely kill over jealousy or anger over sexual rejection, as the authors explain. But if any circumstances might lead a woman to homicide in a situation driven by heat of passion so that a provocation defense should be available to a woman, then the facts surrounding Mary Alice Taylor's crime exemplify them. Forell and Matthews' reasonable woman seeks respect and autonomy, but in this situation, Ms. Taylor has had those values trampled upon by the state's removal of her child without a hearing. Faced with the new threat of removal of her unborn child, the fourteen-year-old Ms. Taylor lost control of her emotions.
We can only speculate as to whether a jury instructed with a rea sonable woman standard would have reached a verdict other than one finding Ms. Taylor guilty of murder. Elizabeth Schneider has com mented on the resistance in the battered women's cases to fe male de fendants receiving equal rights to trial without gender bias. Schneider identifies this failure as based in "a national chord of anxiety about 'abuse excuse' justice."103 "[G]ender bias," she notes, "operates in these cases in both overt and subtle ways .... "104 Schneider's observa tions apply to Mary Alice Taylor's prosecution and conviction as well. Schneider urges that "the particular facts and circumstances of each case must be evaluated in light of the general problem of gender-bias in order to ensure an individual woman's equal rights to trial."105 Mary Alice Taylor's conviction, whether under a reasonable man or woman instruction, illustrates this "resistance to reasonableness."106 In the context of criminal prosecutions, an emphasis on the particular facts and circumstances of each case is especially appropriate because the issue is individual criminal culpability in the face of an established societal norm prohibiting homicide. Where the societal norm is clear, reasonableness in violating that norm is a useful inquiry that relates to criminal culpability. Here the context of the particular circumstances -the state action removing her child and threatening to seize the next one -must be considered in evaluating reasonableness.
Ms. Taylor was an African-American unwed mother, still a child herself.107 She was thirteen when her first child was born; the father 103. Schneider, supra note 51, at 482.
Id.
105. Id. at 487. Like the use of the "reasonable woman," the term "gender bias" fails to focus on the systemic nature of male power and privilege that enables the system of gender bias to continue. Schneider acknowledges "the broader problems of gender subordination" necessary to understanding the problem of battering. Id. at 495.
106. Id. at 503. Schneider identifies this resistance to reasonableness in the dispute over the appropriate standard in the sexual harassment cases. See id. [Vol. 98:1797 was thirty-seven. She needed more than a reasonable woman stan dard in a jury instruction to emphasize the context in which her ac tions occurred. She needed a society that values caregiving108 and sup ports single mothers.109 She needed more care provided for herself during her adolescence. She needed a jury who could recognize the racialized world she inhabits and in which her actions took place.110 She needed jury instructions that address racism. It is unlikely that her jury would value the relationship between this single African American mother and her children without an explanation of the sys tems of privilege in which Ms. Taylor's actions occurred.
In the criminal law setting, a reasonableness standard, even when gendered female, does not go far enough to reveal the social reality in which the criminal conduct occurred. In a setting such as the work place where the societal norm is evolving, the reasonableness standard provides insufficient guidance. The lens of reasonableness may be ac tually harmful in a case like Soto, where the norm of family dynamics is also contested. The police believed that a reasonable woman would return to her husband. Soto illustrates the nightmare for women of a world in which male privilege is reinforced by state action. One goes to the police for protection.111 If that avenue is foreclosed, the state enables male privilege to function unchecked. Taylor, too, presented a scenario in which the state functioned to maintain patriarchal values. The social worker acted on behalf of the state "ex parte and without notice,"112 removing Ms. Taylor's child from her lodging, and taking the child into state custody. Even the court, an arm of the state, speaks of Ms. Taylor as "Mary," while the social worker is named the honorific "Mrs." Linguistically, Mrs. Markham's married position placed her in a role of superiority to "Mary's" unwed-mother status. In this hierarchical landscape, Ms. Taylor's needs cannot be met by a resort to reasonableness.
The Soto case illustrates the poverty of the sameness/difference problem in equality theory which relies on a comparison model to find discrimination. In the domestic violence context, no mirror image comparison exists; the police conduct cannot be compared to other corresponding situations. Unable to make the comparison, the court fails to find a sex discriminatory purpose. The Taylor case exemplifies the essentialism problem in feminist theory. Ms. Taylor is a woman, but her race, age, and economic status, as well as her gender, all con tributed to the tragic events that unfolded. Focusing on the gender portion of her identity can only begin to explain the circumstances that led to her murder conviction.
CONCLUSION
A Law of Her Own: Th e Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man presents a readable summ ary of the gendered issues in sexual harass ment, stalking, domestic homicide, and rape. The authors advocate that the legal system adopt a reasonable woman standard in these ar eas to ensure that harms to women are recognized. The use of a rea sonable woman standard, however, cannot sufficiently challenge the status quo that ignores those harms. In the end, the tensions gener ated by the sameness/difference equality problem and the essentialism problem remain unresolved. An analysis beyond the reasonable woman that recognizes systems of privilege, particularly male privi lege, is necessary to truly give woman a law of her own.
